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Introduction: Why Dialogue with Dewey Today? 
John Dewey was engaged, throughout his work, in the reconstruction of American 
democracy and education. Committed to that philosophy for and in action that is 
pragmatism, a philosophy for solving the problems of human beings, he addressed 
himself to what he saw as the crisis of democracy in twentieth-century America. In 
1927, discussing the erosion of the public sphere in American society, Dewey criti-
cized what he saw as the hollow concept and practice of “citizenship” in democracy. 
In the “void between government and the public,” men became, he warned, “skep-
tical of the effi  ciency of political action.”1 Indiff erence and apathy are the signs of a 
bewildered public—a state where one does not know “what one really wants.”2 Th is 
is a kind of existential crisis of democracy. Dewey reminds us that the phenomenon 
of the “eclipse of the public”3 has a bearing not only on democracy as a matter of 
deliberative procedure or political participation, but also on one’s way of living, on 
an ethical dimension of life: the question of how one should live a good life. For 
him, the political task of democracy, what it means to be a citizen, is inseparable not 
only from the ethical but also from the educational—a dimension of education that 
involves the internal transformation of human being. He proposed the recreation 
of the “Great Community”—a public space in which diff erent individual voices are 
heard through mutual learning and cooperation. How I should live is inseparably 
related to how I live with others. 
In the beginning of the twenty-fi rst century the signifi cance of Dewey’s prag-
matism needs to be critically reconsidered not only in America, but also on a global 
scale. Americanization, as both a dimension and an engine of globalization, fl at-
tens, rather than enhances, global awareness; or worse, it assimilates, in the name 
of hospitality, the diff erent, the foreign, and the silent into its own home. Privatiza-
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tion and selfi sh individualism, the standardization of taste in the global market—
all present challenges to citizenship education. Furthermore the loss of common 
ground between ethnic and religious groups is demonstrated in continuing wars 
and tensions around the world. Th e sense of the lack of common ground is too real 
to be ignored. How should we initiate and continue the search for the common 
when we confront radical diff erences in values, with no apparent hope for recon-
ciliation? In order to rectify this growing sense of lack, education in the “knowl-
edge,” “skills,” and “dispositions” of citizenship has been off ered as a solution.4 Th e 
nature of the skepticism and the nihilistic sense of loss seem to call for something 
more than—perhaps something that precedes—questions of knowledge, skills, and 
dispositions. If Dewey’s philosophy is the product of American thinking, how far 
is it itself a part of the problem of globalization? Or, if it aims to be a voice critical 
of its own culture and society, how far can Deweyan democracy resist the tide of 
Americanization? All these imminent challenges and questions require us to be 
engaged in dialogue with and reconstruction of Dewey’s pragmatism. Th is is also 
necessary for destabilizing the way in which we use the language of democracy in 
the discourse of a globalized economy, and for remembering a forgotten dimension 
of education—one that serves the task of creating democracy as a way of life. Th e 
point of this paper, therefore, is to revive and reconstruct Dewey’s pragmatism so 
that it becomes an alerting and inspiring voice in response to the nihilistic crisis 
of today’s democracy and education. In other words this is a Deweyan task of re-
construction in philosophy, and it prompts the present endeavor in the continuing 
critical reception of the inheritance of American pragmatism. 
First, a hidden (or forgotten) dimension—the Emersonian perfectionist di-
mension—is discussed as a potentially helpful way of enhancing pragmatism’s 
potential today. I shall especially highlight three ethical modes of relation to oth-
ers—open-mindedness, friendship, and sympathy—that Dewey proposes as crucial 
conditions for achieving democracy, starting at home, expanding outwards. Second, 
I shall examine a critical point that tests the limits of Dewey’s pragmatism—critical 
in the sense that his own language can slide into the assimilatory discourse of glo-
balization. In particular his theory of face-to-face communication is destabilized in 
the light of the Emersonian perfectionist notion of conversation, with its implica-
tions for the place of the eccentric within a culture (which turns out, in any case, to 
be cultures). Th e nature of this critical boundary will be elucidated as a repression 
in Dewey’s pragmatism. Finally, I shall point to a way beyond the limits of Dewey’s 
pragmatism—beyond problem solving, towards dissolution—in order critically to 
inherit the asset that it off ers to contemporary democracy and education. 
Democracy, Education, and Pragmatism: Starting at Home, 
Expanding the Neighborhood
As a philosopher of growth, Dewey never gave up his faith in democracy. His strug-
gle to reorient American society toward “liberal-communitarian democracy”—the 
reconstruction of a public space in which individual freedom is realized within 
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community—can be understood as an expression of his hope for democracy. Th at 
democracy can always fall into a state of conformity means that it must never be 
allowed to settle down in relation to some fi xed telos; democracy, thus understood, 
is a state forever to be worked towards, never fi nally to be achieved. Th is refl ects 
his idea of growth without fi xed ends.5 In this regard Dewey inherits perfectionist 
strains of thought from Emerson, which Stanley Cavell names “Emersonian moral 
perfectionism.”6 Dewey himself called Emerson “Th e Philosopher of Democracy.”7 
Upholding the idea of democracy as a way of life throughout his career, he sustains 
a vision of democracy to be expanded outward from within. Our private lives are 
inseparable from the creation of the public. 
One of the crucial factors in democracy as a way of life is “our personal 
relations to other persons,” relations constituted through “free inquiry, free as-
sembly and free communication.”8 To be with others, for Dewey, is not simply 
a physical fact: rather it is an achievement, one that involves assiduous eff orts. 
Democracy as the process of education involves mutual learning from diff er-
ence, from diff erent others as “friends”9: “Th e task of democracy is forever that 
of creation of a freer and more humane experience in which all share and to 
which all contribute.”10 In order to be with others and to learn from them, we 
need, Dewey emphasizes, open-mindedness and friendship: “Open-mindedness 
is not the same as empty-mindedness. To hang out a sign saying ‘Come right in; 
there is no one at home’ is not the equivalent of hospitality. But there is a kind of 
passivity, willingness to let experiences accumulate and sink in and ripen, which 
is an essential of development.”11 “Friendship and intimate aff ection are not the 
result of information about another person even though knowledge may further 
their formation. But it does so only as it becomes an integral part of sympathy 
through the imagination.”12
Th e fi rst quotation here is from Democracy and Education, and the second 
from Art as Experience. In the fi rst, he is not just talking of the welcome given to 
the stranger but of a more general condition of thinking about others—or, we might 
say more generally, an openness to the other. In the second quotation, he ponders 
an idea of friendship, one that cannot be subsumed into an economy of exchange, 
a mode of relationship that precedes the cognitive dimension. As another ethical 
trait, the idea of sympathy is also proposed. In Ethics, Dewey defi nes sympathy as 
follows: “Intelligent sympathy widens and deepens concern for consequences. To 
put ourselves in the place of another, to see things from the standpoint of his aims 
and values, to humble our estimate of our own pretensions to the level they assume 
in the eyes of an impartial observer, is the surest way to appreciate what justice de-
mands in concrete cases.”13 Th e tag of “philosopher of democracy” sometimes leads 
to the idea that Dewey’s concerns are circumscribed within a political arena that is 
relatively narrowly defi ned, but here he expresses his concern with the fundamental 
conditions of human being in our relation to others. Th ese three ethical attitudes 
of open-mindedness, friendship, and sympathy are interrelated to constitute the 
conditions for creative democracy.
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It is especially the later works of Dewey that echo the tone of Emersonian 
moral perfectionism14—of a moral life in which friendship and conversation play 
central roles in the perfection of self and society. Th e rereading of Dewey’s text in 
the light of Emersonian perfectionism helps to tap a hidden potential in his idea 
of democracy as a way of life. Th e political life in Emersonian perfectionism in-
volves the existential and ethical questions of how we ourselves, each of us, must 
confront the shameful condition of democracy—the state Emerson calls “secret 
melancholy”15 and Th oreau, “quiet desperation.”16 Th is is the state of conformity, 
where “[man] dares not say ‘I think,’ ‘I am,’”17—where skepticism raises its head in 
doubting our mutual existence in society, in fomenting our despair at the fact that 
we are “left  out of the basic decisions of the society” in which we fi nd ourselves, 
and in harbouring the insidious, nihilistic belief that that “society is not mine.”18 It 
is, however, in this existential, even emotional sense of loss that Emersonian per-
fectionism fi nds its niche, and from which it seeks its way out. Echoing the voice of 
Emerson, Cavell says that despair is a “political emotion.”19 Likewise in Dewey’s later 
writings—including Th e Public and its Problems, Individualism Old and New, and 
“Th e Creative Democracy Th e Task Before Us”—a despair towards the loss of, and 
hence, a hope for recalling this “political emotion,” or we might even say, political 
passion, are driving forces for the eternal perfection of democracy.
Deweyan creative democracy is and should be applied not only within Amer-
ica, but also beyond its boundaries: it is a principle to be practiced and realized in 
our cross-cultural and international understanding. In his 1921 essay, “Mutual 
National Understanding”—one that expresses something of what he believes he 
has learned from his visits to Japan and China—Dewey talks about international 
understanding between East and West. He delves into a deeper realm of possible 
mutual understanding, beneath physical and external boundaries. Th is passage 
beyond boundaries, however, must start at home. As Dewey says in Th e Public and 
its Problems, 
It is said, and said truly, that for the world’s peace it is necessary that we 
understand the peoples of foreign lands. How well do we understand, I 
wonder, our next door neighbors? It has also been said that if a man love 
not his fellow man whom he has seen, he cannot love the God whom he 
has not seen. Th e chances of regard for distant peoples being eff ective as 
long as there is no close neighborhood experience to bring with it insight 
and understanding of neighbors do not seem better. A man who has not 
been seen in the daily relations of life may inspire admiration, emulation, 
servile subjection, fanatical partisanship, hero worship; but not love and 
understanding, save as they radiate from the attachments of a near-by 
union. Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly 
community.20
He implies that the immediate sense of attachment is a crucial factor in the formation 
of one’s identity; and that “home” is the basis of one’s “love” and “understanding.” 
Dewey is, however, opposed to any exclusive form of patriotism— as this would gen-
Reconstruction in Dewey’s Pragmatism  ? 105
Volume 25 (2) ? 2009
erate “suspicion, fear, oft en hatred, of other peoples” and division among nations.21 
He envisions democracy in a global community as a force that would transcend 
physical, political, and cultural divisions.22 Larry Hickman claims that Dewey is a 
“global citizen” and that his philosophy “provides tools for the formation of global 
publics.”23 David Hansen associates Deweyan democracy with cosmopolitanism.24 
Unlike the kind of cosmopolitanism that Martha Nussbaum proposes (which she 
argues is based upon the idea of “common ends,”25 “humanity as such,”26 and “uni-
versal reason”27), common good in Dewey’s pragmatism is always to be pursued 
and revised in the process of dialogue28: it is humanism without any pre-established 
common humanity. By valuing both the signifi cance of home and global commu-
nity, Dewey’s antifoundationalist pragmatism provides us with a third way, beyond 
the tension between patriotism and cosmopolitanism.
Th us, Deweyan education for global citizenship begins at home by cultivating 
the attitudes of open-mindedness, friendship, and sympathy, and it then expands 
outward toward the distant. Th is cannot be understood as a political task alone: it 
requires an education in mutual learning from diff erence and distance. As Dewey 
says: “Travel is known to have a broadening eff ect, at least if the traveler is willing 
to keep his mind open. Th e amount of enlightenment which is gained from travel 
usually depends upon the amount of diff erence there is between the civilization from 
which the traveler starts his journey and that of the country at which he arrives. Th e 
more unlike the two are, the more opportunity there is for learning.”29
In short, the task of creative democracy in Dewey’s pragmatism is to close the 
gap between the familiar (within home) and the distant (what is beyond home), and 
to reach the best possible condition of mutual understanding—a state “in which all 
share and to which all contribute.” Th e building of such relationships of neighbor-
hood with others, from the intimate to the distant, are passages in the perfection 
of democracy, both at home and on the global scale. 
Repression in Dewey: In Dialogue with the Voice of Emerson 
Questioning Dewey 
If we look at contemporary political situations around the world, however, Dewey’s 
conception and language of democracy and education does raise some questions. 
How does such a vision of global community get going? Dewey’s call for democ-
racy as a way of life needs to be turned to a response to the real diffi  culties of our 
times—including the diffi  culty of inspiring political passion of a kind that tran-
scends narrow patriotism and of expanding the imagination beyond national con-
cerns. Elaine Scarry argues against Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism to the eff ect that 
we should recognize the real diffi  culty of imagining others—both intimate and 
distant.30 At the same time, if we follow Dewey, this does not mean that we should 
give up the hope of cultivating imaginative sensitivity to others. Th is will indeed 
involve looking at that crucial starting point of what happens within home, in our 
relationships to what is familiar to us. And it will perhaps involve seeing home as 
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a place that is already in some sense riven. Th e domestic is the scene of tragedy, as 
Aristotle and the Greek tragedians before him saw; it is a place of familiarity, to 
be sure, but also of jealousies and rivalries, of family rift s; it is the place that must 
somehow eventually be left . Home cannot be (simply) a stable shelter, the founda-
tion of morality: rather it is already complicated by the relationship between the 
mother and father, and by the child’s relation to them. Home is indeed the place of 
the original trauma of separation symbolized by the experience of birth, the place 
of the infant’s realization of separateness. It is the place where you realize parents 
are not perfect, that home is not totally secure. And its stability constitutes, para-
doxically perhaps, the background to a breaking away. It is in these experiences 
that we can start to relate ourselves to the strange and the foreign and we can do 
this from within home. 
It is in response to this challenge that Dewey’s ethical stance on democracy 
and his maxim that “democracy must begin at home” begins to be destabilized 
and his language of mutual national and cultural understanding deconstructed. 
Deweyan growth, growth without fi xed ends, is at the heart of his antifoundation-
alism, and it underwrites his ethical claims regarding one’s relation to others—of 
open-mindedness, friendship, and sympathy. If so, then, we face the questions of 
how we, as readers of Dewey, are to receive the ethical import of his writings with-
out falling into a foundationalist discourse and position on morality, in our own 
relationship with others and other cultures; and of how we are to accept and start 
with the groundless sense of home we are faced with today. Answering to these 
necessitates a shift  of attention concerning how his work is to be read and his lan-
guage responded to. 
More specifi cally, what Dewey conceives as “our personal relations to other 
persons” needs to be critically reconsidered. In order to educate our ways of living 
in the relationship of open-mindedness, friendship, and sympathy, Dewey empha-
sizes the signifi cance of communication in “face-to-face relationships by direct give 
and take.”31 Th e phrase “direct give and take” can be associated with his idea of mu-
tual learning. Th e “highest and most diffi  cult kind of inquiry and a subtle, delicate, 
vivid and responsive art of communication,” he writes, “must take possession of the 
physical machinery of transmission and circulation and breathe life into it.”32
In view of the contemporary state of democracy, however, how can Dewey’s 
language of mutuality and “direct give and take” be distinguished from the econ-
omy of exchange that pervades our thinking, an economy of thought and life that is 
modeled on the global market? How can his vision of vivid communication regain 
its status in a situation where polite gentility and a politic wariness characterize our 
modes of communication? Ours is a mode of speech in which the passionate voice 
of the “I” is ever harder to hear, subsumed as it is into the silence of “quiet despera-
tion.” To realize what Dewey envisions as “a subtle, delicate, vivid and responsive 
art of communication,” we need more than what the discourse of mutuality and 
exchange and the metaphor of the “face-to-face” imply. In Art as Experience, Dewey 
says of our relation to the other: “We learn to see with his eyes, hear with his ears, 
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and their results give true instruction, for they are built into our own structure.”33 
So we might ask Dewey today: Is the existence of the other something that can be 
determined in terms of what is immediately and visibly present to us, and within 
the structures of our own being? Is not there a danger of assimilating the other into 
the same, in the name of mutuality?
Furthermore, on a more global horizon, Dewey’s call for “a freer and more 
humane experience in which all share and to which all contribute” can easily 
be subsumed in the assimilating and unifying force of globalization. To enable 
Dewey’s language to help us expand the horizon of our imagination toward the 
unknown and the strange, beyond what is present to us, face-to-face, we need 
the more radical language that these considerations might suggest: the trauma of 
separation—the trauma at the heart of our becoming human, even at the origin 
of experience itself, in discovering our separateness from others—can be a basis 
for our acknowledgement and acceptance of the disturbance of our relationship 
with the other. 
Attending to the Voice of Emerson 
For the sake of sustaining Dewey’s orientation towards a perfectionist quest for 
common humanity, let us turn again to Emersonian moral perfectionism. It can 
be seen as a form of relational ethics in which “conversation” and “friendship” play 
key roles. Th ey provide occasions when we are re-engaged with language together, 
where (ideally) we continually learn to speak again. Echoing the idea of perfection 
without fi nal perfectibility, Emerson talks about the “game of conversation”: “Con-
versation is a game of circles. . . . When each new speaker strikes a new light, eman-
cipates us from the oppression of the last speaker, to oppress us with the greatness 
and exclusiveness of his own thought, then yields us to another redeemer, we seem 
to recover our rights, to become men.”34 
Conversation here implies something diff erent from the cooperation that is at 
the fore in Rawls’ theory of justice.35 Th e imperfectability of our moral life requires 
us to keep testing words together. Th e mode of conversation is more disturbing, 
sometimes more irritable, and not uncommonly more antagonistic than Dewey’s 
relatively smooth idea of face-to-face communication might entail. Its destabilizing 
force is such that the alleged identity of the self starts to disintegrate and diff use. In 
Dewey’s pragmatism, communication implies the interaction of diverse perspec-
tives, through which mutual understanding is achieved. Th e point of conversation, 
in contrast, is not to know others, to be geared towards settling down in agreement, 
and consequently to share a common ground of understanding. In Cavell’s Emerso-
nian moral perfectionism, it is rather in its disequilibrium, even in its antagonism 
(“my friend as my enemy”36), that conversation achieves the acknowledgement of 
another. Th ough Dewey’s theory of communication is by no means to be identi-
fi ed with exchange in terms of a global market, it retains a tendency to right itself, 
to regain equilibrium through interaction, and it sits close to the point where our 
thinking slides into this.
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Th e need to pay critical attention to such a danger becomes all the more 
clear once we observe the state of the “eccentric” in a culture (or more precisely, 
in the various cultures that make up what is called a culture). Let us listen for a 
moment to the voice of the “Devil’s child” in Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” who seems 
compelled to live in confl ict with the “sacredness of traditions,” to live “wholly 
from within”: “If I am the Devil’s child, I will live then from the Devil.”37 Emerson 
himself asserts: “I will not hide my tastes or aversions.”38 Th e Devil’s child may 
confound you, unsettle you, and threaten you. His may be an unbearable voice 
to hear. But in confronting such a child, what would your response be? Perhaps 
this is Emerson’s endorsement of the strong-willed individual, whose motif is, as 
Cornel West says, “power, provocation, and personality.”39 Perhaps, alternately, we 
may be prompted to think of the necessity of discipline: we are born into a culture 
and live in a language community, and, hence, we must acquire its grammar and 
norms. As Jim Garrison puts this: “Until individuals have acquired command of 
social meanings and values they cannot meaningfully create.”40
Yet these responses seem to cover over a hidden dimension of the voice—one 
that exposes us to the vulnerability and fragility of the human condition. It is equally 
necessary, however, that we respond to the unlimited reservoir of our desires, that 
we live “from within,” for this is an excess that cannot be fully contained in those 
publicly shared meanings. Emerson’s child voices the urgency of such a need. We 
must live with the dual necessities, the necessities of fate and freedom, of initiation 
into culture and deviation from it. And this can create an irresolvable tension—
not only between the individual and her social surroundings, but also within the 
individual, for she is internally torn between inside and outside. Emerson’s empha-
sis can then be interpreted in terms not so much of the priority of individual free-
dom over social discipline or cultural initiation as of the necessity of undergoing 
this tension in itself. His foremost concern here is with the extent to which we can 
acknowledge this gap exposed by the voice of the Devil’s child, by the voice that 
disturbs those apparently shared norms within a culture. As Emerson says: “Th is 
one fact the world hates, that the soul becomes; for that for ever degrades the past, 
turns all riches to poverty, all reputation to a shame, confounds the saint with the 
rogue, shoves Jesus and Judas equally aside.”41  
What the voice of the Devil’s child represents is perhaps the remembrance 
of disparity and distance as the origin of our relation to the other. We enter into 
the muddle of life expressed by the child, as Cavell says with the acknowledgment 
that “[o]ur way is neither clear nor simple; we are oft en lost.”42 Such a mode of 
confronting the other requires a more thorough realization of alterity—a sense of 
the other that is beyond the grasp of our understanding. Cavell says that the pres-
ence of “this other of myself” is a condition of my perfection.43 Th at there is this 
unknownness, this nontransparency, means that my relationship with the other 
can never be directly face-to-face: it is irrevocably indirect, and it always already 
entails an excess beyond mutuality.
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Th is requires us, as was indicated above, to reconsider more radically the 
whole metaphysics of expansive growth while sustaining its antifoundationalist 
line. Th e resuscitation of culture awaits the prophetic voice of the dissident, the 
voice that can “deconfound” that culture, in Stanley Cavell’s phrase. Without such 
resistance within culture, resistance within home, the perfectionist language and 
expansive commitments to hospitality and sympathy can become merely rhetorical, 
ideological; or they can be assimilated into the totalizing force of standardization, 
with its increasingly globalized covering over of diff erence.
A Signifi cant Blindness in Dewey 
In dialogue with Emerson’s voice, we fi nd in Dewey’s text a kind of repression, and 
this is most strikingly illustrated in what sometimes seems to be his distaste for, even 
revulsion at, psychoanalysis. It is this repression that is related to Dewey’s blindness 
to the traumatic aspects of starting at home and building neighborhood. It is this, 
more generally, that demonstrates the limits of his pragmatism. Let us fi rst observe 
what Dewey says about psychoanalysis in Human Nature and Conduct (1921):
So the most popular forms of the clinical psychology, those associated 
with the founders of psycho-analysis, retain the notion of a separate psy-
chic realm or force. . . . But they still cling to the idea of the separate psy-
chic realm and so in eff ect talk about unconscious consciousness. Th ey 
get their truths mixed up in theory with the false psychology of original 
individual consciousness, just as the school of social psychologists does 
upon its side.44
Dewey’s pragmatism resists the danger of an introspective psychology that isolates 
mind from its environments and organic connections. Robert Westbrook says that 
“unlike Freudian ‘repression,’ Deweyan ‘suppression’ was not the normal course of 
things” and that “sublimation was for Dewey a conscious, rational operation” that 
related to more normal psychic events than were the subject of Freud’s studies.45 
For Freud, Westbrook continues, there was the “possibility of a compromise in the 
confl ict of instinct and culture but not of resolution; faith in such a resolution was a 
fi rst principle of Dewey’s social psychology.”46 In other words, his notion of impulse 
in habit reconstruction is a function of resolving confl icts and tensions.
Dewey’s revulsion at psychoanalysis elucidates his pragmatist proclivity to-
wards coping with problems; the placing of coping at the heart of a philosophy is 
tantamount to a kind of denial, as if it were possible to contain problems and modes 
of enquiry within the territory of resolution. It is in such a spirit that we fi nd Dewey 
saying: “All friendship is a solution to the problem.”47 Th us, Dewey omits or muffl  es 
another possibility of acknowledging the deep psychological reality of the trauma, 
an acknowledgement that would require something more like a radical leap, be-
yond the realm of rational control. Westbrook tries to show how Dewey’s later eth-
ics takes a “tragic view of experience,” alongside acknowledgment of the “rarity” 
of consummatory experience.48 But the criticism that his pragmatism lacks a tragic 
sense is hard to shake off .
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Towards Further Reconstruction in Pragmatism: Beyond the 
Discourse of Problem Solving and Action 
What I have been trying to achieve in this paper is a Cavellian deconstructive read-
ing of Dewey’s pragmatism. Th is is not to override the signifi cance of his pragma-
tism, or to assimilate his voice to that of Emerson or Cavell. It is rather to engage 
in a critical reception of American pragmatism, especially its antifoundationalist, 
perfectionist lines of thought, in such a way as to expand its horizon. I believe this 
is a way to revive Dewey’s call for creative democracy in our times. Th at call must 
be addressed also towards the need for humility in the face of alterity, in the face of 
the strangeness of the eccentric, both outside and inside of one’s own home, such 
as to resist the lure of assimilating diff erence into the same. Such an ethical rela-
tionship can be acquired and practiced in our daily living, releasing the exclusive 
and fearful tendencies in our thinking towards the diff erent—beyond national and 
cultural boundaries, in the light of the diff erence within them. Along these lines, 
Dewey’s language of open-mindedness, friendship, and sympathy, and an overarch-
ing concept of “mutual understanding” must be deconstructed. Th e Emersonian 
voice of the Devil’s child destabilizes the idea of home, following the Emersonian 
perfectionist route to creating and criticizing democracy from within, in the passage 
from the private to the public. To address the private—as the nontransparent, the 
unknown, and the invisible—is not to take a reactionary turn towards subjective 
preference, imagined, as this sometimes is, to be the only alternative to transpar-
ency and visibility: it is to attend to the voice that brings us up short, that makes us 
aware of prevailing forces that would turn mutuality into exchange, and convert 
the urge to understand into the source of repression. 
To lend an ear to the Devil’s child within a culture requires a shift  in our 
thinking, away from problem solving and towards dissolving and dissolution—in 
such a way as to sustain a sense of the unsolved tension, the rift , between instinct 
and culture. What is at stake here is not mutual understanding, but a kind of en-
counter that is prompted by a mismatch, by the sense of separation, by relationships 
in disequilibrium. It is this very sense of a gap that cannot be found in Dewey’s dis-
cussions of open-mindedness and mutual understanding.
In place of the sometimes polemical pragmatism of problem solving, Cavell’s 
philosophical inclination is towards a more overarching transformation of the very 
way we picture the problems of our lives. He contrasts here a Wittgensteinian ap-
proach to problems with that of Deweyan pragmatism: “for my taste pragmatism 
misses the depth of human restiveness, or say misses the daily, insistent split in the 
self that being human cannot, without harm to itself, escape.”49 As Philosophical 
Investigations shows repeatedly, the problems philosophy sets for itself are not so 
much to be solved as to be dissolved. But what that book also reveals to the atten-
tive reader is that the philosophical pressure behind the problems does not simply 
dissipate but keeps coming back. One response, the one to be resisted, in the face 
of these pressures is to cling fast to the fi xities of our understanding, our belief that 
systematic solutions are to be found. Another is to acknowledge the moment of 
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impasse, the necessary rift , the inevitable separation. Th is, Cavell says, is Wittgen-
stein’s “scene of instruction.”50 In confronting the moment when “I have reached 
bedrock, and my spade is turned,” Cavell’s response, borrowing from Wittgenstein, 
is to keep engaged in the “eccentricities” of the unknown in search of (a temporary, 
though secure) ground in “our use of language with each other.”51 
Here, as Cavell suggests, dissolution is not simply a matter of thinking but 
inevitably conditioned by the language we choose to use. Th e exercise of one’s lan-
guage, testing it together in conversation, is a way of learning “membership in the 
polis,” and this involves identifying citizens as “neighbors.”52 And yet neighboring, in 
the wake of Cavell’s take on dissolution, cannot be simply communal: rather it must 
address us to the fact that “education for citizenship is education for isolation”53: 
how to reach out our hands to others from within the state of quiet desperation, 
while acknowledging separation as the human condition in confronting the voice 
of the eccentric. Such conversation requires particular modes of engagement—those 
of “listening, the responsiveness to diff erence, the willingness for change”54—and 
the kind of vulnerability the “I” exposes in confronting the other, or the element 
of risk, of destabilizing the moral ground on which the “I” is standing, you risk 
“your understanding of the other as of yourself.”55 Both responsiveness and vul-
nerability, in Cavell’s view, are related to Emerson’s reconfi guration of Kant, with 
“the intellectual hemisphere of knowledge as passive or receptive and the intuitive 
or instinctive hemisphere as active or spontaneous.”56
Conversation provides the occasion through which the “rights of one’s own 
desires” are given words, through which they are acknowledged.57 What is alleged 
to be “eccentric” is not just left  inaccessible, trapped in the unknown, but awaits 
its expression. Th ere is then a responsibility to lend an ear to “the grief, the sense 
of rejection, that this [person’s] extended muteness bespeaks.”58 Th e other to one-
self emerges in the course of conversation in the moment when, in eff ect, one “can 
ask [the other] to rescue [oneself] from [one’s] fear of expression.”59 In Emersonian 
perfectionism a recovery from skepticism, a way out of silence (the deprivation of 
one’s voice), points towards a regaining of this “desire to think”, to the “possibil-
ity of thinking”, against the “denial of the world.”60 To be able to say “I think” is 
to regain “authority in . . . speech”61: it is to take responsibility for “my” words. 
Conversation matters precisely because of this recovery, the remembrance of one’s 
desire to speak again.
To fold back this dissolution into pragmatism, into its hallmark ideas of 
action and practice, is to revitalize pragmatism’s connection with language. In 
Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy, we use language by “knowing which forms 
in what contexts are normative for performing the activities we perform by using 
language.”62 Th e performative here diff ers from performativity in Lyotard’s sense 
or from the appeal to visible action in problem solving that is typically found in 
Dewey’s pragmatism. Subverting any dichotomization of action and language, the 
performative here can be related to the language cultivated in Emersonian conver-
sation. If we seriously seek for a way for education to inspire the political passion of 
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the young, to allow them, in their own state of silent melancholy, to remember their 
desire to think, this broadened sense of the performative must also be a dimension 
of citizenship education—one that perforce will oft en precede or go beyond visible 
action and immediate change.63 
Citizenship education thus reconsidered, through this reconstruction of 
Dewey’s pragmatism from the perspective of Cavell’s Emersonian moral perfection-
ism, cannot be assimilated into a conventional discourse of political and citizen-
ship education—not even into those forms that highlight mutual understanding 
and the politics of recognition. Th e diff erence is most clearly marked when it comes 
to dealing with what is alleged to be eccentric within a culture. Against the politi-
cal slogan of citizenship with inclusion, Dewey, whom this paper seeks to release 
from his own repression, may now dare to call for citizenship without inclusion 
as the most sincere possibility of our neighbourly relations with others. Th is also 
means to acquire the state of being “beside oneself in a sane sense,” which is to say, 
to be next to oneself.64 Such a thought might in the process release us too from the 
drive towards the identifi cation and articulation of the core of the self, whose self-
expression oft en succumbs ironically to assimilation and conformity.
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